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Abstract
Since the passage of the ADA, the question of who counts as
disabled has been a heavily contested legal issue. Within this context,
individuals who claim that their weight constitutes a disability
challenge stereotypes of disabled people as innocent, unfortunate
victims of personal tragedy. Their claims highlight both the tension
†. Ph.D. 2020, University of Oregon, Sociology Department; J.D. 2011, George
Washington University Law School; Staff Attorney at the Oklahoma Disability Law
Center, part of the Protection and Advocacy System. I would like to thank Professors
Stephen Meyers and Richard York for their feedback and assistance with this
manuscript.
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between the social and medical models of disability, which are
intertwined in the ADA, and the ways in which perceptions and
stereotypes, rather than impaired bodies, can create disability.
Drawing on theoretical insights from fat studies literature, this
article examines the circumstances under which courts conclude that
being fat is a status that deserves anti-discrimination protection
under the ADA. Using content analysis and logistic regression
models, I find that fat plaintiffs fared worse (1) when their claims
were based on perceived (rather than actual) disability and (2) when
courts required them to prove the underlying cause of their weight.
Findings suggest that the social model of disability has not been
fully implemented under the ADA, and fat and disability rights
activists must carefully consider the way they frame cases to prevent
the perpetuation of negative stereotypes of individuals in both
categories.
Introduction
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to protect the rights of people with disabilities. 1 Over the
next twelve years the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the law,
effectively diminishing the ADA’s power.2 During the same period,
there was significant public outcry against the law based on two
assumptions: that it provided disabled people unfair benefits and
that it unduly burdened businesses.3 Due to both these judicial
decisions and the political climate, a heated debate emerged in the
legal community about who counts as disabled under the law. 4
Individuals not typically considered disabled, such as fat people,5
were a focal point of this controversy. This study assesses whether
1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(4).
2. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
3. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER
REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS (2003).
4. See BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) [hereinafter BACKLASH].
5. I use the word “fat” as a descriptor, following many fat studies scholars who
want the word to become just an ordinary term similar to “tall” or “dark-haired.”
Medical researchers, the media, and legal actors overwhelmingly use the terms
“obese” or “overweight” and thus I sometimes use those terms when engaging with
these mainstream contexts. Additionally, I use both “people with disabilities” and
“disabled people,” interchangeably. See Erin E. Andrews, Anjali J. Forber-Pratt,
Linda R. Mona, Emily M. Lund, Carrie R. Pilarski & Rochelle Balter, #SaytheWord:
A Disability Culture Commentary on the Erasure of “Disability”, 64 REHABILITATION
PSYCHOL. 111 (2019); Barbara J. King, ‘Disabled’: Just #SayTheWord, NPR, (Feb.
25, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2016/02/25/468073722/disabled-justsaytheword [https://perma.cc/X6MX-PP4M].
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fat is an ADA-protected status in the realm of employment
discrimination and examines the judicial reasoning underlying the
pertinent court decisions. The results reveal that courts continue to
use disability status to differentiate between individuals deemed
worthy of social support, such as the anti-discrimination protection
examined in this paper, and those considered undeserving. Further,
judges tend to use a medical model of disability, rather than a social
model, to demarcate the line between the deserving and the
undeserving; specifically, judges reinforce the medical model of
disability by focusing on determining an underlying medical cause
for a person’s impairment.
The ADA defines disability according to a hybrid social–
medical model. Under the ADA, disability is defined as “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits [a] major life
activit[y].”6 Importantly, however, a person is considered disabled
either if they actually have such an impairment or if they are
perceived as having one.7 Thus, the definition itself recognizes the
importance of stereotypes and perceptions in creating the
experience of disability.8 Beginning in the late 1990s, the Supreme
Court interpreted this definition quite narrowly, and thus excluded
people with a variety of impairments from the statute’s protection,
including any person whose impairment could be mitigated through
medication, prosthesis, or other forms of treatment, such as
individuals with diabetes, epilepsy, mobility impairments, back
problems, and even polio survivors.9 By excluding these individuals
from the category of disability, the court effectively ruled that
discrimination on the basis of these conditions was permissible.
In making these determinations, the courts relied on
traditional understandings and common-sense stereotypes of
disability as a condition of dependency, helplessness, inability, and
lack—the very stereotypes the ADA sought to change10—to decide
who was deserving of disability-based anti-discrimination
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
7. Id. § 12102(1)(A)–(C).
8. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“This third prong of the definition of
disability was originally intended to express Congress’s understanding that
‘unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about disabilities
are often just as disabling as actual impairments, and [its] corresponding desire to
prohibit discrimination founded on such perceptions.’ 2008 Senate Statement of
Managers at 9.”).
9. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 35–37 (2009); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the
ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 26–27 (2000).
10. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Construction of the Meaning of Disability, in BACKLASH, supra note 4, at 122–23.
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protection. In response to these decisions (which many scholars
have characterized as a “judicial backlash”), Congress passed the
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008, which explicitly
overturned the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the definition
of disability.11 The ADAAA affirmed that the ADA should be
interpreted in a way that provides protection to a broad range of
disabled people.12 In addition, the Amendments Act sought to shift
the focus of legal disputes from the detailed analysis of an
individual’s bodily limitations to the evaluation of claims of
discrimination and the determination of the reasonableness of
potential accommodations.13 Even after the passage of these
amendments, however, the issue of which conditions count as
legally protected disabilities continues to be a subject of debate
among legal scholars as well as a frequent focus of court rulings. 14
Within this context of judicial skepticism toward disability
claims, the court experiences of fat individuals serve as a fruitful
arena for examining the legal reasoning around disability. In these
lawsuits, stereotypes of fat and stereotypes of disability clash and
judges draw on competing logics of personhood to determine who is
“truly disabled.”15 This article employs a mixed-methods approach,
combining content analysis and regression modeling to identify
which factors influence judicial decisions pertaining to whether fat
is classified as a disability under the ADA, decisions that have
important implications for social justice. Defining fat as a disability
allows fat individuals to fight employment discrimination via
currently existing legislation, shifts blame from individuals to social
structure, and highlights the way in which prejudicial attitudes
create disablement.
I develop my argument as follows: First, I review the pertinent
literature; this summary includes a discussion of the scholarly
insights from disability studies and fat studies, highlighting both
tensions and overlap between these two fields, followed by an
overview of the ADA, the judicial backlash against the ADA, and

11. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 § 2(a)(3)–
(7); see generally BACKLASH, supra note 4 (discussing judicial and societal backlash
against the ADA).
12. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
§ 2(b)(1).
13. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
§ 2(b)(6).
14. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 9; Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination
of Case Outcomes under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027
(2013).
15. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 38.
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key judicial decisions about whether fat is a disability. Second, I
describe the data and methodology used in the study. Third, I
present the empirical results. Finally, I conclude with a discussion
of the significance of the findings for political activism around fat
rights, the need for disability rights activists to carefully consider
the ways in which anti-discrimination litigation medicalizes
disability, and the barriers that stereotypes continue to pose for
both fat and disabled people seeking equal treatment in the
employment sector.
I.

Literature Review
A. Disability Studies

Traditionally, disability has been understood as bodily lack,
excess, or flaw; as a personal tragedy; and as a medical problem.16
Disability studies scholars assert that moving past medicalized
assessments would benefit all disabled people.17 Both historically
and currently, disability serves as a category to distinguish between
the deserving and undeserving poor, and medicine plays a key role
in making this distinction.18 When the rise of industrial factories
and the standardization of the pace and modes of production left no
room for impaired people to participate in the labor market,
institutions, such as the poorhouse and workhouse, arose to house
individuals who could not work. 19 In this context, disability came to
serve as a proxy for worthiness, used to distinguish between those
who could not work and those who would not work.20 The
medicalization of disability played a key role in this process by
acting as a legitimating device capable of identifying and
distinguishing between able-bodied workers who were shirking
their duties and blameless disabled people. Disabled people were

16. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disability
Concept, 26 HYPATIA 591, 591 (2011). See generally THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER
(Lennard Davis ed., 5th ed. 2017); MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT
(1990).
17. See, e.g., PETER CONRAD, THE MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: ON THE
TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN CONDITIONS INTO TREATABLE DISORDERS 148–61
(2007). See generally THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 16.
18. See RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY
POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE (2001); DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984).
19. See Vic Finkelstein, Disability and the Helper/Helped Relationship: An
Historical View, in HANDICAP IN A SOCIAL WORLD (Ann Brechin, Penny Liddiard &
John Swain eds., 1981); BRENDAN GLEESON, GEOGRAPHIES OF DISABILITY 99–126
(1997); OLIVER, supra note 16.
20. See O’BRIEN, supra note 18; STONE, supra note 18, at 32–39.
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viewed as incapable of work and therefore deserving of support. 21
Unfortunately, this medicalized perspective continues to hinder
disabled people today; the ADA has not improved disabled people’s
high rates of unemployment,22 and disability rights advocates
continue to fight stereotypes of disabled people as juvenile,
innocent, and unable to work.
The disability studies literature seeks to shift this
understanding to a conception “of disability as a social construction
whose meaning is determined primarily through discourse,” power,
and knowledge. 23 An early step in this movement was the
development of the social model of disability,24 which separates
impairment and disability (similar to the sex/gender distinction
developed by feminist scholars).25 Impairment refers to the
abnormal body, whereas disability arises from a specific type of
societal organization that excludes and devalues impaired people. 26
This shift from understanding disability as a personal tragedy to
understanding disability as a problem of social justice was
“theoretically groundbreaking”27 and the latter remains the
primary conception employed by disability rights activists today.
The ADA and ADAAA implement the social model of disability by
including individuals who are “perceived” or “regarded” as disabled
(i.e., those who are disabled by the prejudices of others) within the
law’s protection—these individuals’ disabilities do not arise directly
from their bodies, but rather from the stereotypes held by others.28
21. See Finkelstein, supra note 19; GLEESON, supra note 19; OLIVER, supra note
16; Marta Russell & Ravi Malhotra, Capitalism and Disability, 38 SOCIALIST REG.
211 (2002).
22. See Michelle Maroto & David Pettinicchio, The Limitations of Disability
Antidiscrimination Legislation: Policymaking and the Economic Well-being of People
with Disabilities, 36 L. & POL’Y 370, 370–71 (2014).
23. See SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY (1998);
Garland-Thomson, supra note 16, at 591.
24. See OLIVER, supra note 16, at 78–94.
25. GAYLE S. RUBIN, DEVIATIONS: A GAYLE RUBIN READER 39 (2011) (describing
“sex” as the “biological raw material of human sex and procreation” and “gender” as
the “human, social intervention” that relentlessly rearranges “sex” for society into
social conventions).
26. E.g. OLIVER, supra note 16, at 78–94; but see TOBIN SIEBERS, DISABILITY
THEORY (2008); Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY
STUDIES READER, supra note 16 (arguing that both impairment and disability are
socially constructed and that the social model discounts the embodied experience of
impairment or disability).
27. See Garland-Thomson, supra note 16 at 592.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553,
3554 § 4(a)(3); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“Nor is it necessary to
demonstrate that the impairment relied on by a covered entity is (in the case of an
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In the disability studies literature, disability encompasses a
broad range of bodily differences. As scholar Rosemarie GarlandThomson explained, “In short, the concept of disability unites a
heterogeneous group of people whose only commonality is being
considered abnormal.”29 Disability studies scholars tend to consider
fat a disability both because negative stereotypes and cultural
myths surround fat bodies and because inaccessible social
structures may impose actual limitations on a fat body. GarlandThomson and Lennard Davis, two of the most well-known disability
studies scholars, have argued that fat should be considered a
disability—for example, Lennard Davis wrote that the outcome in
Cook (a First Circuit ruling considering morbid obesity to be a
disability) “led to an enlightened land”30—and most scholars in the
field follow this recommendation. This categorization of fat as a
disability relies directly on the social model of disability, in which
disability arises from both stereotypes, such as contempt for
abnormal bodies, and social structures. Garland-Thomson
concluded that “[t]he fat body is disabled because it is discriminated
against in two ways: first, fat bodies are subordinated by a built
environment that excludes them; second, fat bodies are seen as
unfortunate and contemptible.”31
B. Fat Studies
For fat studies scholars and activists, the fit between fat and
disability is somewhat more complicated. Fat studies arose out of
the work of grassroots political organizing and seeks to bring these

actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) substantially
limiting for an individual to be ‘regarded as having such an impairment.’ In short, to
qualify for coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong, an individual is not subject to any
functional test. See 2008 Senate Statement of Managers at 13.”).
29. Rosemarie Garland‐Thomson, Re-shaping, Re-thinking, Re-defining:
Feminist Disability Studies at 2, in BARBARA WAXMAN FIDUCCIA PAPERS ON WOMEN
AND GIRLS WITH DISABILITIES (Ctr.
for Women Pol’y Stud., 2001),
https://www.womenenabled.org/pdfs/Garland-Thomson,Rosemarie,Redefining
FeministDisabilitiesStudiesCWPR2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAL2-E4VF].
30. Still, there is more work to be done. Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over
Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193,
211 (2000) (citing Cook v. R.I., Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993)) (“While the plaintiff in Cook ultimately prevailed amid this
orgy of purple prose and the journey of the court led to an enlightened land, the
metaphors used still tell us that the court is out there in the dark. Despite the heroic
efforts of this decision and the self-referential congratulations for this exploration
and bringing of light to the darkness, which perhaps comprehendeth it not, the basic
problem remains.”).
31. Rosemarie Garland‐Thomson, Feminist Disability Studies, 30 SIGNS: J. OF
WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 1557, 1582 (2005).
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radical politics into the academy.32 The discipline unites work from
a variety of fields based on a shared focus on critiquing the negative
stereotypes and stigma placed on the fat body.33 Contemporary
cultural discourses portray fat bodies as ugly, lazy, and unhealthy. 34
Sociologist Abigail Saguy suggested that the current dominant
discourse frames fat as a public health crisis caused by a lack of
personal responsibility.35 Samantha Kwan and Jennifer Graves
referenced both the health frame and the aesthetic frame,
concluding that “current cultural discourses stigmatize fat bodies
as ugly and unhealthy.”36 Fat studies scholars seek to subvert these
dominant perspectives, asserting that fat bodies can be both healthy
and beautiful. In addition, the field questions the prevalent
assumption that weight is mutable and controllable.37
Fat individuals living in the context of the widespread anti-fat
culture of the United States face discrimination, prejudice, and
mistreatment in many aspects of their lives.38 The stigma
surrounding obesity limits social, educational, and employment
opportunities.39 This bias develops early in life—researchers have
found that “children would rather play with other children who had
missing legs or eyes than children who were obese; adults would
rather be deaf or blind than fat.” 40 Further, people report that if
given the choice, they would prefer to be of normal weight and poor
than fat and a millionaire.41 Fat Americans may be less likely to
attend prestigious schools, obtain desirable professions, and receive
equal pay for their work.42

32. See MARILYN WANN, FAT! SO? (1998).
33. See SONDRA SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FIGHTING WEIGHTBASED DISCRIMINATION (2000).
34. See SAMANTHA KWAN & JENNIFER GRAVES, FRAMING FAT. COMPETING
CONSTRUCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (2013); ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT’S
WRONG WITH FAT? (2014).
35. See SAGUY, supra note 34.
36. See KWAN & GRAVES, supra note 34, at 101.
37. See Esther D. Rothblum, Why a Journal on Fat Studies?, 1 FAT STUD. 3, 4
(2012) (“[F]at activists felt that the terms ‘overweight,’ ‘underweight,’ and ‘normal
weight’ all imply that there is an attainable ‘ideal’ weight when in fact there is a
great diversity in weight.”).
38. Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 220–23 (2009).
39. Id. at 221.
40. Id. (citing ELLEN RUPPEL SHELL, THE HUNGRY GENE: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE OBESITY INDUSTRY 18–19 (2002)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Fat has been subjected to medicalization43 through its
association with medical problems such as osteoarthritis, cancer,
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, gallbladder disease, hypertension,
infertility, liver disease, pancreatitis, and sleep apnea. 44 According
to a 1998 report by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), obesity
(excess fat) is “a complex multifactorial chronic disease” caused by
“social, behavioral, physiological, metabolic, cellular, and
molecular” factors.45 Critical scholars have begun to research the
role of environmental toxins such as endocrine disrupters (which
are present in many products and foods) in individuals’ weight gain
as well as the faulty assumptions in many of the studies that have
found a correlation between fat and negative health outcomes.46 For
example, in a series of experiments conducted with mice, scientists
found that although both the control and experimental groups were
given the same amount of food and exercise, the latter group, which
was exposed to endocrine disrupters, gained more weight. 47 These
studies suggest, at the very least, that the cause of an individual’s
body size is up for debate. Finally, no studies using a large enough
sample to permit generalization have demonstrated that long-term
weight loss is possible or improves health.48
Thus, both fat and disabled people have bodies that are subject
to medicalization, stigma, and structural or architectural exclusion.
Like people with “traditional” disabilities, people who are fat
encounter limitations in public places such as when they do not fit
into spaces designed for average-sized people. For example, “[t]hey
may not fit in the seats in a movie theatre; they may not be able to
fit into a chair in a restaurant or on a ride in an amusement park.”49
Lawyer and fat studies scholar Sondra Solovay argued that severely
43. CONRAD, supra note 17, at 4 (“‘Medicalization’ describes a process by which
nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical problems, usually in
terms of illness and disorders.”).
44. Overweight & Obesity Statistics, 2017 NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE
& KIDNEY DISEASES (2017), https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/healthstatistics/overweight-obesity [https://perma.cc/587H-S584]; NHLBI OBESITY EDUC.
INITIATIVE EXPERT PANEL ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF
OBESITY IN ADULTS (US), CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE I DENTIFICATION,
EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS xi, 19 (1998)
[hereinafter NHLBI OBESITY EDUC. INITIATIVE].
45. NHLBI OBESITY EDUC. INITIATIVE, supra note 44, at 27.
46. See JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS
OF CAPITALISM (2012); SAGUY, supra note 34.
47. GUTHMAN, supra note 46.
48. Paul Campos, Abigail Saguy, Paul Ernsberger & Eric Oliver, The
Epidemiology of Overweight and Obesity: Public Health Crisis or Moral Panic?, 35
INT’L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 55 (2005).
49. Korn, supra note 38, at 226–27.
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obese people “are substantially limited in a major life activity that
the average person has no difficulty with—navigating all places of
public accommodation during the course of an ordinary day.”50
Several fat studies scholars have examined the connections
between fat and disability, highlighting the shared experience of
stigma. Charlotte Cooper described how the social model of
disability spoke to her own experience of fatness, remarking, “[f]at
and disabled people encounter discrimination in all areas of our
lives, from our families, from strangers on the street, in the
workplace and in society, where we are constantly reminded that
there is something wrong with us.”51 Cooper found commonalities
between fat and disabled people in terms of physical access (fitting
into spaces), experiences of shame and pity, a lack of appropriate
media representation, and a shared “low social status.”52 Lucy
Aphramor also identified parallels between the two groups,
describing similarities in discrimination against fat job applicants
and little people applying for jobs: in both instances, discrimination
is related to stereotypical beliefs about abilities and fear of
customers’ negative reactions.53 April Herndon made a parallel
comparison between disability and fat, in this case exploring
discrimination toward fat and Deaf people.54 Finally, two recent
theoretical articles suggested that fatness can be considered a
disability.55
Despite the similarities between these models of fat and
disability, fat activists have not generally aligned themselves under
the umbrella of disability, instead seeking to pass size-based antidiscrimination laws.56 Fat rights activists explain this approach as
reflecting a desire not to be associated with the characteristics
50. SOLOVAY, supra note 33, at 148.
51. Charlotte Cooper, Can a Fat Woman Call Herself Disabled?, 12 DISABILITY
& SOC’Y 31, 36 (1997).
52. Id. at 32, 36.
53. Lucy Aphramor, Disability and the Anti‐obesity Offensive, 24 DISABILITY &
SOC’Y 897, 903 (2009).
54. See April Herndon, Disparate but Disabled: Fat Embodiment and Disability
Studies, 14 NWSA J. 120 (2002).
55. See Toby Brandon & Gary Pritchard, ‘Being Fat’: A Conceptual Analysis
Using Three Models of Disability, 26 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 79 (2011); Nathan Kai‐
Cheong Chan & Allison C. Gillick, Fatness as a Disability: Questions of Personal and
Group Identity, 24 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 231 (2009).
56. See ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND
PERSONHOOD (2008) [hereinafter FAT RIGHTS]; Anna Kirkland, What’s at Stake in
Fatness as a Disability?, 26 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1 (2006); Anna Kirkland, Think of
the Hippopotamus: Rights Consciousness in the Fat Acceptance Movement, 42 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 397 (2008) [hereinafter Think of the Hippopotamus]; SAGUY, supra note
34.
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stereotypical of disability: lack, dependency, and inability.57 For
example, in her interviews with fat rights activists, Kirkland found
that they resisted an association with disability “because it
complicated their arguments that fat people are fully functional and
healthy.”58 In an exception to this pattern, activist Marilyn Wann
suggested that using the disability label was a pragmatic choice,
observing that “[i]n the dark times, you use whatever you have.”59
Overall, however, fat rights advocates have rejected the disability
label because of its continued medicalization, which construes the
problem of disability as arising from the body’s limitations.60 Fat
activists see the fat body as healthy and beautiful—problems result
not from fat bodies, but rather from society’s negative response to
fat people. This view aligns with a strong version of the social model
of disability embodied by the ADA, in which disability arises not
from the impaired body, but from society’s reaction to such bodies.
One final perspective on the way fat fits, sometimes uneasily,
as a disability is related to what Kirkland has called “logics of
personhood,” which are defined as “the ways we talk to each
other . . . about whether a person’s difference should matter for
what she deserves, and why.”61 Anti-discrimination protection for
disabled people has been justified by historical discrimination and
segregation, as well as the view that their differences do not
materially affect their ability to work.62 In Fat Rights, Kirkland
attempted to fit fat within the overall field of anti-discrimination
law by examining logics of personhood. For example, the logic of
actuarial personhood can justify race and gender protections.63
Because these traits relate primarily to appearance and do not
change an individual’s functional ability, an employer should ignore
these traits and focus on the abilities of the worker. However, this
logic does not apply to someone who has a functional difference,
such as an employee who uses a wheelchair and may require a sink
to be lowered in the bathroom or a fat employee who may need a
chair without armrests. In these cases, courts use a different logic
of personhood, which Kirkland calls managerial individualism and
defines as “a process-focused, context-specific approach to

57. Kirkland, What’s at Stake in Fatness as a Disability?, supra note 56;
Kirkland, Think of the Hippopotamus, supra note 56.
58. Kirkland, Think of the Hippopotamus, supra note 56, at 417.
59. Id. at 420 (quoting Marilyn Wann).
60. Id. at 422.
61. FAT RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 27.
62. Id. at 40–41.
63. Id. at 20–23.
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differences that requires an organization to do something to
accommodate the person with a disability.”64 Kirkland suggested
that the logic of managerial individualism (a focus on the unique
qualities of individual bodies and personal accommodations)
depoliticizes identity groups, and that, in practice, including fat
people within the ADA’s category of disability would further
medicalize fat and hinder the affirmatory politics desired by fat
activists.65 Specifically, under the ADA, fat people would be subject
to the same medicalized court assessments of their “functional
capacities” as other disabled people.66
Cases in which fat is alleged to be a disability reveal the
differences between stereotypes of disabled people—who are
perceived as deserving of pity or as unfortunate victims, helpless,
and unable to work in or contribute to the labor market—and
stereotypes of fat people—who are perceived as lazy, blameworthy,
and victims of their lack of self-control rather than victims of bad
luck. The pity reserved for disabled people in U.S. culture is not
usually extended to fat people.67 Studying fat as disability
highlights the way that these stereotypes and the resulting
prejudice, as well as physical architectural barriers, construct the
experience of disability. Disability studies scholars assert that the
devaluation of bodies considered “abnormal” constitutes a barrier to
the social inclusion of disabled people and to the formation of an
identity category based on bodily abnormalities.68 Even when an
individual obtains physical access to a space, the behaviors and
attitudes of others may effectively eliminate the accessibility of the
space.
C. Passage of the ADA and Subsequent Backlash
The ADA seeks to remedy the historical isolation, segregation,
and discrimination that people with disabilities have encountered
and to reaffirm the right of people with disabilities to participate

64. Id. at 22.
65. Id. at 133.
66. Id.
67. See SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE AND
THE BODY 185–86 (Tenth Anniversary ed., 2003) (describing the “massive and
multifaceted nature” of the industries built to promote slender bodies and how
preoccupation with fat pushes women especially to police their own bodies).
68. See, e.g., Irving Kenneth Zola, Bringing Our Bodies and Ourselves Back In:
Reflections on a Past, Present, and Future “Medical Sociology”, 32 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 1 (1991); Nick Watson, Well, I Know This Is Going to Sound Very Strange to
You, but I Don’t See Myself as a Disabled Person: Identity and Disability, 17
DISABILITY & SOC’Y 509 (2002).
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fully in all aspects of society.69 Passed with bipartisan support in
1990, top liberal and conservative supporters framed the bill as a
way to move disabled people off of welfare and into the workforce.
The ADA received such broad support because it appealed to both
conservative cost-cutting interests and the liberal impetus to
increase anti-discrimination protections.70
The ADA’s language is not particularly revolutionary or
different from the language used in other anti-discrimination laws,
yet the law provides a unique legal solution. Under the ADA,
employers must provide disabled workers with reasonable
accommodations necessary for them to be effective in their jobs.71
Unlike other anti-discrimination laws, which only provide
monetary damages, the ADA gives workers the power to change
their workplace environment to meet their needs and forces
employers to adapt business practices to better serve their
workers.72
Soon after its passage, courts began interpreting the ADA in
ways that stripped it of its potential.73 Specifically, courts narrowed
the ADA’s definition of disability to restrict the potential impact of
the law by limiting the number of people it protected.74 Ruth Colker
provided empirical evidence of this restriction. According to Colker,
from 1992 to 1998, 93 percent of ADA employment discrimination
cases were decided in favor of employers, most often because
employees were not considered disabled as defined by the ADA. 75
The ADA implements a hybrid medical–social model of
disability. Although the preamble of the legislation explicitly
recognizes that disability arises from certain social relations rather
than being the automatic outcome of having an impaired body,76
69. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)–(8) (1990).
70. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 5 (observing that “[b]oth liberal and
conservative supporters of the ADA tapped into authentic aspects of disability rights
thinking” and that “[t]hose aspects converged in support for the statute as it
proceeded through Congress.”); BACKLASH, supra note 4, at 273 (noting the ADA is
supported by “the liberal terms of equal rights” and by “conservative cost-efficiency
rationales.”).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)–(B).
72. See Befort, supra note 14; Diller, supra note 9, at 39–47.
73. See BACKLASH, supra note 4.
74. See BACKLASH, supra note 4; BAGENSTOS, supra note 9; Diller, supra note 9,
at 26–27.
75. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999); see also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2012) (“[P]hysical or mental disabilities in no way
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legal analysis continues to focus on an individual’s body as the site
of disability. Under the ADA:
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.77

This definition serves a gate-keeping function because meeting it is
a threshold issue for employee-litigants in determining whether
they are protected by the ADA.78 An individual “who does not
qualify as disabled * * * does not meet th[e] threshold question of
coverage in the protected class and is therefore not permitted to
attempt to prove his or her claim of discriminatory treatment.”79
In defining disability, the ADA attempts to move away from a
strict medical understanding of disability. Determining whether an
individual is disabled under the statute is supposed to be an
individualized assessment based on a person’s specific abilities and
not a medical diagnosis.80 There is no inherent or “per se”
disability.81 This individualized inquiry requires courts to move
away from broad generalizations, stereotypes, and assumptions
about disabled peoples’ abilities. In practice, however, stereotypes
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, yet many people
with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing so because of
discrimination[.]”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“[I]n
enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no
way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that
people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so
because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and
institutional barriers.”).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C) (2012).
78. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) app. (2012) (citing STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS
TO ACCOMPANY S. 3406, 110TH CONG. (2008) (“The first of these is the term
‘disability.’ ‘This definition is of critical importance because as a threshold issue it
determines whether an individual is covered by the ADA.’ 2008 Senate Statement of
Managers at 6.”)).
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-730 at 6 (2008)).
80. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v) app. (2012) (“The comparison of an individual’s
performance of a major life activity to the performance of the same major life activity
by most people in the general population usually will not require scientific, medical,
or statistical analysis. Nothing in this paragraph is intended, however, to prohibit
the presentation of scientific, medical, or statistical evidence to make such a
comparison where appropriate.”).
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) app. (2012) (“As the regulations point out, disability
is determined based on an individualized assessment. There is no ‘per se’ disability.
However, as recognized in the regulations, the individualized assessment of some
kinds of impairments will virtually always result in a determination of disability.”).
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and medical diagnoses continue to play key roles in these
individualized assessments.
The third prong of the ADA’s definition, “being regarded as
having such an impairment” recognizes the role stereotyping plays
in excluding disabled people. This aspect of the ADA’s disability
definition is particularly important for non-traditionally disabled
people, such as the fat people whose cases are examined in this
study. Legislative history indicates that Congress intended this
prong of the definition to address “unfounded concerns, mistaken
beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about disabilities [which] are
often just as disabling as actual impairments . . . .”82 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) uses the example of
physical disfigurement to explain perceived disability:
The third part of the definition protects individuals who are
regarded and treated as though they have a substantially
limiting disability, even though they may not have such an
impairment. For example, this provision would protect a
severely disfigured qualified individual from being denied
employment because an employer feared the “negative
reactions” of others.83

In effect, a fat employee bringing a claim of perceived
disability discrimination argues that the way others viewed and
treated them based on their weight, rather than their weight in and
of itself, made them disabled.
A final critical aspect of the disability definition for fat
employees is the word “impairment.” Although the ADA does not
define impairment, various EEOC regulations do. For example, in
the context of employment at the federal Institute of Museum and
Library Services, a physical impairment is defined as “[a]ny
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive;
genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine . . . .”84 In
addition, the Appendix to the EEOC regulations includes language
distinguishing impairments and other physical characteristics:
“The definition of the term ‘impairment’ does not include physical
82. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012).
83. The ADA: Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N
(May 1, 2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/adaqa1.cfm [https://perma.cc/
KP53-GL23].
84. 45 C.F.R. § 1181.103(1).
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characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or
height, weight, or muscle tone that are within ‘normal’ range and are
not the result of a physiological disorder.” 85 Some courts have
interpreted this guidance to mean that weights within the normal
range can be an impairment if caused by a physiological disorder, 86
while others have held that to be an impairment, weight must be
both outside the normal range and caused by a physiological
disorder.87
In 2008, Congress passed the ADAAA for the explicit purpose
of reversing the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of who is
considered disabled under the law. 88 Congress urged courts to shift
their focus from whether an individual is disabled “enough” under
the law to issues such as whether a discriminatory act had occurred
or whether the accommodations an individual requested were
reasonable.89 The ADAAA eclipsed prior interpretations of the law
and removed the substantial limitation requirement from the
definition of a perceived disability.90 Under the new statute, a
person is categorized as disabled if they are treated adversely

85. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (2012) (emphasis added) (“It is important to
distinguish between conditions that are impairments and physical, psychological,
environmental, cultural, and economic characteristics that are not impairments.”).
86. See Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that
plaintiffs’ weights, which were not beyond a normal range, might be qualifying
impairments if plaintiffs had “alleged that they suffer from a physiological disorder
(which, for example, has produced excessive weight or lack of fitness despite their
individual efforts)”); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2nd Cir. 1997)
(noting that simple (not morbid) obesity may be a qualifying impairment when it
“relates to a physiological disorder”); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.Supp. 739,
746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (distinguishing a situation in which a plaintiff bodybuilder’s
weight was in the normal range and exceeded an employer limit from a hypothetical
case in “which the plaintiff’s weight was involuntary—e.g., the result of a glandular
problem”).
87. See Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997); Francis v. City of
Meridan, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2nd Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d
436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir.
2016).
88. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
§ 2(a)(3)–(7); BACKLASH, supra note 4.
89. Id. § 2(b)(4)–(6).
90. Id. § 2(b)(3)–(6); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“Accordingly, the
ADA Amendments Act broadened the application of the ‘regarded as’ prong of the
definition of disability. 2008 Senate Statement of Managers at 9-10. In doing so,
Congress rejected court decisions that had required an individual to establish that a
covered entity perceived him or her to have an impairment that substantially limited
a major life activity. This provision is designed to restore Congress’s intent to allow
individuals to establish coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong by showing that they
were treated adversely because of an impairment, without having to establish the
covered entity’s beliefs concerning the severity of the impairment. Joint HoyerSensenbrenner Statement at 3.”).
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because of an actual or perceived impairment.91 They do not need to
prove that the impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.92 At least one study has found that employees with a
variety of disabilities have won a significantly higher proportion of
cases since the passage of the ADAAA. In an examination of 237
ADA decisions, Stephen F. Befort found that before the ADAAA,
district courts decided nearly 75 percent of cases in favor of
employers on the basis that the employees were not disabled, while
after the ADAAA, only 46 percent of district court cases had similar
outcomes.93 These results suggest that the ADAAA had its intended
effect of applying the ADA’s protections to a broader range of
employees.
D. A Review of Case Law: Fat as Disability
Under the ADA, eighteen cases94 alleging employment
discrimination on the basis of fat have reached appellate courts (15
before the application of the ADAAA and three after).95 These cases
91. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“To illustrate how straightforward
application of the ‘regarded as’ prong is, if an employer refused to hire an applicant
because of skin graft scars, the employer has regarded the applicant as an individual
with a disability. Similarly, if an employer terminates an employee because he has
cancer, the employer has regarded the employee as an individual with a disability.”).
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. (2012) (“In any case involving coverage solely
under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the definition of ‘disability’ (e.g., cases where
reasonable accommodation is not at issue), it is not necessary to determine whether
an individual is ‘substantially limited’ in any major life activity. See 2008 Senate
Statement of Managers at 10.”).
93. See Befort, supra note 14, at 2050–51.
94. Only ten of these decisions were published, and therefore, have precedential
value.
95. See Cook v. R.I., Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17
(1st Cir. 1993); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997); Francis v. City of
Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 129 F.3d 607, No. 9750194, 1997 U.S. App. WL 680835 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 1997); Watters v. Montgomery
Cnty. Emergency Commc’n Dist., 129 F.3d 610, No. 97-20118, 1997 U.S. App. WL
681143 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 1997); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d
661 (3d Cir. 1999) (not included in the sample because depression was the first
claimed impairment); Pepperman v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 201 F.3d 436,
No. 99-1366, 1999 U.S. App. WL 1082546 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999); McKibben v.
Hamilton Cnty., 215 F.3d 1327, No. 99-3360, 2000 U.S. App. WL 761879 (6th Cir.
May 30, 2000); Wilson v. Cap. Transp. Corp., 234 F.3d 29, No. 99-31156, 2000 U.S.
App. WL 1568200 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2000); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d
436 (6th Cir. 2007); Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.
2007); Bass v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 287 F. App’x 808, No. 08-10549, 2008 U.S.
App. WL 2831988 (11th Cir. 2008); Cordero v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 300 F. App’x
679, No. 08-11213, 2008 U.S. App. WL 4902656 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2008); Spiegel v.
Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256 (10th
Cir. 2010); Lescoe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.-SCI Frackville, 464 F. App’x 50, No. 11-2123,
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have focused on two primary issues: First, is fat an impairment (i.e.,
a physiological disorder)? Second, does a person’s weight act as a
substantial limitation? Importantly, many of these cases
illuminated the role of stereotypes in disabling fat workers. Ten
plaintiffs brought only claims of perceived disability, in effect
arguing that being fat was a disability only because others
perceived them as unable to do their jobs. 96 The first case of
employment discrimination based on fat as a disability to reach a
federal court of appeals laid out a framework that was later
employed in subsequent litigation. In this case, Bonnie Cook
brought and won a claim of perceived disability, arguing that she
was disabled because of the erroneous, stereotypical beliefs of her
employer regarding her weight.97 Cook, an institutional attendant
with a “spotless” work record, was not rehired after taking a
voluntary leave because the hospital, her former employer, believed
that her morbid obesity “compromised her ability to evacuate
patients in case of an emergency and put her at greater risk of
developing serious ailments . . . .”98 Although Cook did not claim
that she, personally, was disabled by fat, she needed to prove that
fat was an impairment that could form the basis of a claim of
disability discrimination under the ADA.99 Thus, Cook presented
expert testimony that morbid obesity is a “physiological disorder
involving a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the
neurological appetite-suppressing signal system, capable of causing
adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and
cardiovascular systems.”100 In addition, Cook demonstrated that
morbid obesity is immutable; her expert witness testified that
metabolic dysfunction continues even after weight loss.101
Other circuits interpreted Cook and the expert testimony
presented in a variety of ways. The requirement that a fat litigant
prove that their weight is (1) a physiological disorder itself or (2)
caused by a physiological disorder shaped appellate decisions in the

2012 U.S. App. WL 505896 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2012); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817
F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016); Kelly v. Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., 708 F. App’x 60 (3d Cir.
2017).
96. See Spiegel, 604 F.3d 72; Greenberg, 498 F.3d 1258; EEOC, 463 F.3d 436;
Wilson, No. 99-31156, 2000 WL 1568200; Walton, 168 F.3d 661; Francis, 129 F.3d
281; Watters, No. 97-20118, 1997 WL 681143; Johnson, No. 97-50194, 1997 WL
680835; Andrews, 104 F.3d 803; Cook, 10 F.3d 17.
97. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22.
98. Id. at 20–21.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 24.
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Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits.102 In 1997, the Second and Sixth
Circuits decided cases in which firefighters and police officers,
respectively, challenged weight limits.103 In both cases, the
plaintiffs argued that their employers perceived them as disabled
because they failed to meet weight limits.104 However, neither court
affirmed that the plaintiffs were disabled. The Second Circuit
concluded that the firefighters had not shown that their weights
were related to a physiological condition and the Sixth Circuit found
that the officers did not allege that their weights were out of the
normal range or caused by a physiological condition. Notably, both
the Second and Sixth Circuit rulings addressed obesity, but not
morbid obesity.105 Both courts were concerned that extending the
ADA to fat employees contradicted the law’s purpose.106 In
justifying these decisions, the courts distinguished fat litigants
from the “truly disabled,” arguing:
The ADA “assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable,
individuals will not face discrimination in employment because
of stereotypes about the insurmountability of their handicaps.
It would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections
available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by
102. Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 2016) (“In sum,
we conclude that for obesity, even morbid obesity, to be considered a physical
impairment, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition.
This remains the standard even after enactment of the ADAAA, which did not affect
the definition of physical impairment. Because Morriss failed to produce evidence
that his obesity was the result of an underlying physiological disorder or condition,
the district court properly concluded that Morriss did not have a physical
impairment under the ADA.”); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir.
1997) (“Francis’s claim fails because obesity, except in special cases where the obesity
relates to a physiological disorder, is not a ‘physical impairment’ within the meaning
of the statutes.”); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Because a
mere physical characteristic does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder,
where an employee’s failure to meet the employer’s job criteria is based solely on the
possession of such a physical characteristic, the employee does not sufficiently allege
a cause of action under these statutes.”).
103. Francis, 129 F.3d at 282; Andrews, 104 F.3d at 805–06.
104. Francis, 129 F.3d at 282; Andrews, 104 F.3d at 805–06.
105. Francis, 129 F.3d at 285 (“Francis only alleges that his employer disciplined
him for failing to meet a general weight standard. He does not claim that his
employer regarded him as suffering from a physiological weight-related disorder.”);
Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (“The officers herein do not allege that their weights or
their cardiovascular fitness are beyond a normal range, nor have they alleged that
they suffer from a physiological disorder (which, for example, has produced
excessive weight or lack of fitness despite their individual efforts).”).
106. Francis, 129 F.3d at 286; Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (“To hold otherwise would
(to paraphrase the Fourth Circuit) distort the ‘concept of an impairment [which]
implies a characteristic that is not commonplace’ and would thereby ‘debase [the]
high purpose [of] the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped.’”).
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anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative severity
of impairment was widely shared.”107

In 2006, the Sixth Circuit extended the requirement of proving
a physiological cause to morbid obesity.108 More recently, the Eighth
Circuit held that even after the ADAAA, employee-litigants must
show that their morbid obesity is related to a physiological cause. 109
A second group of appellate decisions focused not on whether
fat was an impairment or a physiological condition, but instead on
whether fat was a substantial limitation for plaintiffs. As in the first
group of cases, fat employees in these cases also brought claims of
perceived disability, as highlighted by the unpublished Fifth Circuit
case Johnson v. Baylor University.110 Johnson, a fat pilot, was
terminated for failure to lose weight; Baylor University believed
Johnson’s weight had a negative impact on potential university
donors flying in his plane.111 As the court summarized, “Johnson’s
position put him in contact with many important university
benefactors and therefore required a certain comeliness on
Johnson’s part that might not otherwise be required.”112 Johnson
argued that his employer’s perception of him as disabled was the
basis for his termination.113 The court concluded, however, that
Johnson was not perceived as disabled, arguing that to prove this
claim he would need to show that Baylor perceived him as being
substantially limited in his ability to work in a broad range of jobs,
not just jobs in which appearance must have a positive impact. 114
The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have decided cases on
similar grounds, finding that employees did not fit the disability
definition because their impairments were not substantially
limiting.115
107. Francis, 129 F.3d at 286 (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th
Cir. 1986)).
108. EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2007).
109. Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 2016).
110. Johnson v. Baylor Univ., No. 97-50194, 1997 WL 680835 (5th Cir. Sept. 18,
1997).
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *3.
114. Id. at *4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C)) (“The ‘regarded as,’ or ‘perception,’
prong of the ‘disability’ definition requires that a plaintiff provide evidence that the
employer thought that other employers would not hire him because of his obesity.”).
115. Lescoe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.-SCI Frackville, No. 11-2123, 2012 WL 505896, at
*2 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2012) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
185 (2002)) (“Although this Court has not definitively reached a position regarding
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Since the Cook ruling, only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
have treated fat as a disability under the ADA in published
decisions.116 In an unpublished decision, the Third Circuit
considered a plaintiff’s weight to be a protected disability; however,
the plaintiff lost her case because her employer had articulated a
non-discriminatory reason for her termination.117 Thus, only three
circuits have precedential decisions considering fat a disability.
Given these precedents, it is not surprising that most law review
articles on this topic have concluded that fat is rarely considered a
disability by courts.118 Further, these articles seem to assume
whether obesity is a disability under the ADA that limits a major life activity, the
District Court did not err in finding that Lescoe did not establish any major life
activities that were adversely affected by his weight. He passed numerous medical
and physical exams to obtain the position as well as a five-week training program.
Moreover, Appellant ‘must further show that the limitation on the major life activity
is substantial.’”); McKibben v. Hamilton Cnty., No. 99-3360, 2000 WL 761879, at *5
(6th Cir. May 30, 2000) (“Although McKibben has not explicitly identified the
‘regarded as’ prong under which he proceeds, his arguments fall under the first
prong. He insists that his alleged ‘morbid obesity’ constitutes an impairment and
that the defendants regarded his weight as substantially limiting the major life
activity of working. We disagree. Even if his alleged ‘morbid obesity’ qualifies as a
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit the major life
activity of working, McKibben has not offered any evidence that the defendants
regarded his weight as such a substantial limitation.”); Greenberg v. Bellsouth
Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Greenberg has not shown
that he has an impairment that substantially limits him in one or more major life
activities. First, a person is ‘substantially limited’ in a ‘major life activity’ if he cannot
care for himself; on this point, the evidence indicates that Greenberg bathed and
dressed himself and could perform household chores.”).
116. In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit explained:
Here there are two potentially qualifying disabilities: obesity and diabetes.
The question of whether the defendant is disabled was not decided by the
district court. The district court stated that: ‘For the sole purpose of
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case, this
Court will . . . assume that Plaintiff has met his burden in proving that he
is a disabled person.’ . . . . On appeal, neither side has fully briefed this
question nor is there a record on which to base a decision on whether Mr.
Wilkerson is disabled. Further, we find other aspects of the analysis
dispositive. Thus, like the district court, we will assume that Mr. Wilkerson
has met this prong of the analysis.
Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 2010). See also Bass v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-10549, 2008 WL 2831988, at *3 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that Bass did not show that the proffered reasons for his termination were
pretextual).
117. Kelly v. Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., 708 F. App’x 60, 63–64 (3d Cir. Sept. 11,
2017).
118. See, e.g., M. Neil Browne, Virginia Morrison, Barbara Keeley & Mark
Gromko, Obesity as a Protected Category: The Complexity of Personal Responsibility
for Physical Attributes, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 20 (2010) (“[O]bese plaintiffs
alleging employment discrimination under the ADA or RHA have been met with
fervent opposition.”); Jeffrey Garcia, Weight-Based Discrimination and the
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common-sense understandings of fat and disability, such as the
notion that individuals are not at fault for being disabled but are at
fault for being fat, rather than understandings put forth by
disability and fat studies scholars.119
Americans with Disabilities Act: Is There an End in Sight?, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
209, 228 (1995) (“In most cases, however, excess weight, without a related medical
condition or other impairment, has not been considered a handicap.”); Carol R.
Buxton, Obesity and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 BARRY L. REV. 109, 127
(2003) (“Unless obesity is determined to be a disease, the Americans with Disabilities
Act is not the place for the obese to seek shelter, with the exception of the perceived
disability prong.”); Patricia Hartnett, Nature or Nurture, Lifestyle or Fate:
Employment Discrimination Against Obese Workers, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 807, 821
(1993) (“Though the proposed regulations acknowledge that obese plaintiffs may
argue that their status constitutes a disability protected by the ADA, the Act states
that it is generally not to be construed as providing such protection.”); Abigail Kozel,
Large and in Charge of Their Employment Discrimination Destiny: Whether Obese
Americans Now Qualify as Disabled Under the Americans with Disability Act
Amendments Act of 2008, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 273, 327 (2009) (“Before
2009, essentially no claims for protection under an obesity-as-a-disability ADA
protection stood a chance of success.”); Elizabeth Kristen, Addressing the Problem of
Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 57, 81 (2002) (“[C]ourts have
been generally unsympathetic to claims by fat plaintiffs under the [ADA] and the
Rehabilitation Act.”); Shannon Liu, Obesity as an “Impairment” for Employment
Discrimination Purposes Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act
of 2008, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 141, 166 (2010) (“[P]ast case law has not considered
obese individuals as disabled or obesity as an impairment for ADA purposes.”); Amie
A. Thompson, Obesity as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act and the Amendments’ Effect on Obesity Claims Under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act: Should Employers Anticipate a Big Change?, 12
DUQ. BUS. L.J. 259, 271 (2010) (“[M]ost [courts] that have addressed the argument
[that obesity is a handicap or disability] have found it unpersuasive.”). But see, e.g.,
Elizabeth E. Theran, “Free to Be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious”: Weight-Based
Discrimination and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 113 (2001) (arguing that more courts will likely find obesity a protected
disability).
119. For example, as Browne, Morrison, Keeley and Gromko describe:
The cause of obesity properly plays a major role in our response to the
treatment of obese persons under the law. In the extreme, suppose obesity
were akin to childhood cancer. As a community, we would see the obese as
vulnerable, as humans in need of our legal and financial sympathy.
On the other hand, suppose obesity is similar to the effects of choosing
to walk into the direct path of a raging rhinoceros. While we might want to
claim that no one could make such a choice, there is too much extant
evidence that many, and quite seemingly sensible, people make choices that
have almost certain destructive consequences.
In this latter instance, wherein obesity is the result of voluntary choices
that reasonable people should understand as having severe consequences,
the legal reaction to obesity would be to hold people accountable for their
actions. We would treat the obese as responsible adults who knowingly
chose a lifestyle of which obesity was a highly probable result. Thus, the
obese should face the consequences of their actions, just as should anyone
whose choices we sanction.
Browne et al., supra note 118, at 39–40. For other examples, see also:
Imagine a healthy, active man who is involved in a tragic car accident. The
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II. Methods
A. Sample
To collect this data set, I conducted multiple searches of
Westlaw (a database used by legal scholars to collect and examine
legal documents, including judicial opinions) using the key terms
“obesity,” “obese,” “morbid obesity,” “fat,” and “Americans with
Disabilities Act.” These searches produced a list of hundreds of
cases, which I then refined by retaining only those brought under
the ADA and excluding cases brought under state and other antidiscrimination statutes.120 I further narrowed the sample by
focusing on instances of employment discrimination, which is a
common practice in ADA research and ensures that cases share a
similar underlying structure and present similar claims. 121 Finally,
I restricted the sample to cases in which obesity or morbid obesity
was the primary claimed impairment, excluding cases in which fat
was included as part of a list of four or more medical diagnoses.122

accident leaves him paralyzed from the waist down and he can no longer
walk. He remains as active as he possibly can, with the aid of his wheelchair.
Medical technology, as advanced as it has become, cannot restore the use of
his legs. Compare him to a five-foot six-inch woman who began gaining
weight at the age of eighteen. By the time she is 22, her weight has swelled
to 385 pounds. Most likely due to her large body size, she is constantly
hungry and sometimes eats six meals a day—mostly at fast food
restaurants.
Unlike the man in the wheelchair, she can change her condition, and she
did. Under a doctor’s supervision, she changed her eating habits and began
an exercise routine. In the span of fifteen months, she lost one hundred
pounds. Though at times difficult and seemingly impossible, she worked
towards her goal and was able to achieve it. Now ask that man in a
wheelchair what he would be willing to do to walk again. One can only guess
what his answer would be. Congress seemingly recognized the immutability
of a disability and the need for a law to protect the truly disabled.
Buxton, supra note 118, at 113; Kristen, supra note 118, at 82 (“[U]sing disability
antidiscrimination laws is problematic from an ideological perspective, since most
fat people would argue that they are not disabled and are in fact perfectly capable of
doing the same work as thin people.”).
120. I also included cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act because this is the
statute under which federal employees bring claims of disability employment
discrimination. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2018).
121. See generally Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, supra note 75 (studying outcomes in ADA employment discrimination
cases); Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra
note 75 (finding that plaintiffs bringing disability claims in court are more successful
if their discrimination is charged with the EEOC).
122. For example, I excluded the Third Circuit decision in Walton v. Mental
Health Ass’n of Southeastern Pennsylvania because Walton’s primary impairment is
depression. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir.
1999).
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This process resulted in a data set of eighty-seven cases that
occurred between 1993 and 2018. The data include every judicial
opinion available on Westlaw in which fat was the primary claimed
disability in an ADA employment lawsuit from 1990 to 2018. Unlike
traditional legal research, the sample includes both commonly cited
appellate cases and more obscure district court opinions. In
addition, the sample includes unreported opinions (i.e., opinions
that the ruling court regarded as having insufficient precedential
value and thus are not available for citation as legal precedent). 123
The final sample includes cases from all twelve circuits, or legal
regions. Each circuit is legally independent from the others,
although the ADA, as a federal statute, applies equally in each
region. An appellate court decision in a circuit sets the legal
interpretation for lower district courts to follow, but the high courts
in other circuits may interpret the ADA differently.
The sample has three notable limitations. First, relatively few
acts of employment discrimination result in litigation 124 and the
majority of cases settle out of court.125 Therefore, this study of case
law may not be representative of all disability discrimination in the
workplace. Second, the sample does not include claims brought
under state disability anti-discrimination statutes or claims
seeking disability supplemental security income (SSI) benefits or
workers’ compensation. This choice was strategic. Although the
extant research suggests that the ADA has not increased disabled
people’s employment rates126 and that most people who bring cases
under the ADA lose them,127 scholars have found that the ADA
holds symbolic meaning for many disabled people, even those who
do not actively use the law.128 Finally, not all states and circuits are
123. The lack of precedent does not affect the current analysis, which focuses not
on legal precedent, but on how the ADA disability definition is applied to fat
employee-litigants.
124. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 525, 545 (1980).
125. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in
the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010).
126. See Maroto & Pettinicchio, supra note 22, at 373.
127. See Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
supra note 75, at 100.
128. E.g., DAVID ENGEL & FRANK MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003)
(demonstrating how the ADA plays a role in the positive identity formation of some
disabled Americans). Based on in-depth interviews, Engel and Munger found that
disability rights affirmed their respondents’ belief in themselves as capable people
and changed their thinking about their bodily difference. As a federal civil rights
statute, the ADA may hold even more symbolic power in shaping disability identity.
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equally represented in the sample, most likely due to specific state
and municipal laws. The sample includes only one case from
Michigan and no cases from California. The lack of cases from
Michigan is likely the result of a state law prohibiting weight-based
discrimination under which lawyers could bring a claim (Michigan
is the only state with such a law).129 Similarly, the absence of cases
from California is likely the result of lawyers being able to bring
claims under multiple municipal laws.130 Municipalities in New
York, Wisconsin, Illinois, and the District of Columbia also have
weight-based protections that may have influenced the shape of this
sample.131
B. Coding
I coded each legal opinion for the type of disability claim made
by employees: actual disability, perceived disability, or both. I also
coded for the year, court circuit (region), procedural stance,
intersectional claims, expert witness testimony, and the primary
legal issue. With respect to plaintiffs’ demographic characteristics,
I coded for gender, occupation, and weight (morbid or simple
obesity). The dependent variable is whether the court considered
the plaintiff disabled, which is a preliminary requirement to
receiving anti-discrimination protection under the ADA. Because
the research question examines whether fat is a disability under the
ADA, the analysis focuses on the disability determination rather
than whether the plaintiff won or lost the claim. To ensure intercoder reliability, a second attorney reviewed and coded a random
sample of 10 percent of the cases. There was full agreement between
coders on all variables.
C. Variables
Many of the variables, such as procedural posture, year, and
circuit, were explicitly listed in judicial opinions. Others required a
further step to determine; for example, gender was identified
through pronoun usage and first names. I coded opinions for weight
by categorizing plaintiffs as either obese or morbidly obese, based

129. See Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2101–2803
(West 1976). See also Equality at Every Size, NAT’L ASS’N TO ADVANCE FAT
ACCEPTANCE, (September 18, 2020), https://naafa.org/eaes [https://perma.cc/6Z7AZLBD].
130. See Equality at Every Size, supra note 129 (describing both the San Francisco
Administrative Code and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code).
131. Id. (discussing legal protections in Binghamton, NY; Madison, WI; Urbana,
IL; and Washington, DC).
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on the height/weight listed in the opinion or the courts’ language
use (e.g., describing a plaintiff as morbidly obese). Although fat
studies scholars use the simple descriptor “fat,” judicial opinions
exclusively employed the medicalized terms “obese” and “morbidly
obese.” In three cases I could not determine whether an employee
was considered obese or morbidly obese;132 in the rest of the sample,
sixty-four individuals were categorized as morbidly obese and
twenty were categorized as obese. The variable “expert witness”
identified cases in which the plaintiff presented testimony from a
medical expert, physician, or nurse regarding their impairment or
limitations. Using the coding system developed by Jonsson et. al.,
occupation was coded as either manual or non-manual and as
belonging to one of ten meso-classes (classical professions,
managers and officials, other professions, sales, clerical, craft, lower
manual, service workers, primary [agriculture], or proprietors); 133
in three cases, I was unable to identify the plaintiff’s occupation. 134
Because prior research has found that employee-litigants who
bring intersectional claims (more than one identity-based claim of
discrimination) fare worse than those who bring single-focus
claims,135 I coded for whether the plaintiffs brought claims based on
gender, racial, or age discrimination as well as disability. The
independent variable for claim type (actual disability, perceived
disability, or both) was easily determined based on court analysis
in most cases, but I was unable to determine claim type in three
cases.136 In addition, I coded for the dispositive legal issue (the issue
132. See Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC., No. 1:10CV24–A–D, 2010 WL 5232523,
at *6 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (“Plaintiff claims that she is disabled due to her
weight.”); Marsh v. Sunoco, Inc., No. 06-CV-2856, 2006 WL 3589053, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 6, 2006) (“Plaintiff alleges that Sunoco regarded him as disabled on account of
his weight and discriminated against him on that basis in violation of the ADA.”);
Watters v. Montgomery Cnty. Emergency Commc’n Dist., 129 F.3d 610, No. 9720118, 1997 WL 681143, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 1997) (“In her Second Amended
Original Complaint, Watters claims that she was perceived ‘to be disabled because
of her weight’ and that her weight was perceived as severely restricting her ‘ability
to perform various job related tasks.’”).
133. Jan O. Jonsson, David B. Grusky, Matthew Di Carlo, Reinhard Pollak &
Mary C. Brinton, Microclass Mobility: Social Reproduction in Four Countries, 114
AM. J. SOCIO. 977, 997 (2009).
134. See Smaw v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994);
Funk v. Purdue Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Ind. 2004);
Bird v. County of Greene, No. 06-1281, 2007 WL 626106 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2007).
135. See Rachel Kahn Best, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lauren B. Edelman & Scott
R. Eliason, Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in
EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 994–95 (2011).
136. See Franz v. Kernan, 951 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Redd v. Rubin, 34
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Willis v. San Antonio ISD, No. SA-16-CA-00887-ESC,
2017 WL 3470944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017).
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on which the case was decided): whether the plaintiff’s fat was a
physiological condition, whether the plaintiff was substantially
limited, whether discrimination occurred, or another issue. Finally,
I created dummy variables to control for precedent; these variables
categorized circuits as having positive appellate decisions (a ruling
that fat was a disability), no appellate decisions, or negative
appellate decisions (a ruling that fat was not a disability).
The dependent variable, whether the court ultimately
considered the plaintiff disabled or non-disabled, was based on a
close reading of the judicial opinions. In some of the cases coded as
disabled (fourteen cases, or sixteen percent of the sample), the court
did not directly rule that the specific employees were disabled, but
rather “assumed” that these employees were disabled as defined by
the law in order to analyze the remainder of their legal claims.
Determining whether an employee-litigant is disabled as defined by
the law is a threshold issue—to evaluate a claim of discrimination,
the court must necessarily consider a person disabled, otherwise the
law would simply not apply to the situation. Courts that assume
employees are disabled to proceed with an evaluation of their claims
of discrimination are following Congress’ intention, as expressed in
the ADAAA, that the determination of disability “not demand
extensive analysis . . . .”137 Thus, these cases were coded as disabled.
In contrast, in cases that were coded as not disabled, the courts had
explicitly ruled that the ADA did not apply to a specific plaintiff
because they were not disabled.
D. Analysis
I conducted two logistic regression models because “this is the
standard procedure for analyzing binary dependent variables.”138
The relatively small sample size placed constraints on the
multivariate statistical analyses due to limited degrees of freedom
and low statistical power. Because of these challenges, the inclusion
of a large number of independent variables in the models would
have reduced statistical efficiency and almost certainly ensured
that no factors would have a significant effect. Therefore, I selected
control variables particularly carefully.
137. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
§ 2(b)(5) (“[T]o convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under
the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of
whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not
demand extensive analysis . . . .”).
138. See Richard York, Kyoto Protocol Participation: A Demographic Explanation,
24 POPULATION R SCH. & POL’Y REV. 513, 520 (2005).
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III. Results
Table 1 includes a list of all cases in the sample as well as the
year and region in which the final decision was published. The table
also shows the types of claims made by employees (perceived/actual)
and whether the court considered the employee disabled under the
ADA. In addition, the percentage of employees considered disabled
is listed next to the circuit name.
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Table 1: All Cases by Circuit with Year, Claim Type, and
Disability Decision

First Circuit (75%)
Cook 1993, P
Nedder 1995, P A
Ridge 1999, P
Perez 2009, P A

D
D
N
D

Fourth Circuit (20%)
Smaw 1994, P A
Pepperman 1999, A
Hill 2009, P A
Michaels 2011, A
Bucklew 2012, A

N
N
N
N
D

Seventh Circuit (45%)
Bryant 1997, P
Clemons 1997, P
Bochenek 1998, P A
Zarek 1998, P
Funk 2004, P A
Barrett 2009, A
Revolinski 2011, P A
Budzban 2013, A
Luster-Malone 2013, A
Richardson^ 2017, P
Shell^ 2018, P
Tenth Circuit (100%)
McDonald 1995, A
Wilkerson 2010, A
Carpentier^ 2018, P

D
N
N
N
D
D
N
D
N
N
D

Second Circuit (54%)
Smallwood 1995, A
Francis 1997, P
Hazeldine 1997, A
Butterfield 1998, P A
Furst 1999, P A
Honey 2002, A
Connor 2003, P
Warner 2003, P
Alfano 2006, P A
Spiegel 2006, P
Caruso 2008, P A
Frank 2010, P A
Sibilla^ 2012, P
Fifth Circuit (55%)
Texas Bus 1996, P
Johnson 1997, P
Watters 1997, P
Wilson 2000, P
Whaley 2002, P
Magnant 2006, A
Melson 2009, A
Tedford 2010, A
Lowe^ 2010, P A
Resources^ 2011, P
Willis^ 2017, Eighth Circuit (50%)
Morrow 1996, A
Franz 1996, Fredergill 1997, P
King 2000, P A
Whittaker^ 2014, P A
Morris^ 2016, P A

D
N
D
D
N
D
D
D
D
N
N
D
N
D
N
N
N
N
D
D
N
D
D
D
D
D
N
N
D
N

Third Circuit (60%)
Motto 1997, P
Polesnak 1997, P
McCarron 2001, A
Goodman 2005, P
Marsh 2006, P
Bird 2007, A
Ni 2010, A
Lescoe 2011, P A
Clem^ 2017, P A
Kelly^ 2017, A

D
D
D
N
N
D
N
N
D
D

Sixth Circuit (29%)
Andrews 1997, P
Miller 1997, A
McKibben 2000, P
Brantley 2006, A
Cox 2006, A
Watkins 2006, P
Hopkins 2007, P R

N
D
N
N
N
N
D

Ninth Circuit (67%)
Beem 2011, A
Hayes 2011, A
Valtierra^ 2017, P A

D
D
N

Eleventh Circuit (33%)
D.C. Circuit (100%)
Barnett 1997, A
D Redd 1998, D
Murray 1999, P
N Bunyon 2002, A
D
Coleman 2000, P A
N
West 2000, A
N
D
Cordero 2007, A
N
Dale 2007, P
N
Greenberg 2007, P A
D
Bass 2008, A
N
Cristia 2008, P A
N
Middleton 2008, P A
N
Powell^ 2014, P A
D
White^ 2017, P A
NOTE: ^ indicates that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 applied. D indicates that the
court treated an employee as disabled and reviewed the rest of the claim. N indicates a
determination that the employee was not disabled. P refers to a claim of perceived
disability, A refers to a claim of actual disability, and R refers to having a record of
disability. – indicates that the court opinion did not explain whether an employee-litigant
brought a perceived or actual disability claim. The percentage of cases in which employees
were deemed disabled is listed next to each circuit heading.
D
D
D
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The opinions were split evenly, with employees considered
disabled by the courts in 50.57 percent of the cases and explicitly
deemed not disabled as defined by the ADA in 49.43 percent of the
cases. The percentage of employees considered disabled varied
dramatically across circuits, however, from 20 percent in the Fourth
Circuit to 100 percent in the Tenth Circuit. In eight of the twelve
regions or circuits, 50 percent or more of employees were considered
disabled under the ADA; three of these circuits had published
appellate court decisions ruling that an obese or morbidly obese
employee was not disabled.139
There was also variation in disability determinations over
time. In the first decade covered in the study, 1990 to 2000, thirtythree cases were brought, and 42 percent of these employeelitigants were considered disabled. From 2001 to 2008, twenty-four
cases were brought, and 50 percent of employee-litigants were
considered disabled. Finally, from 2009 to 2018, thirty cases were
brought, and 60 percent of these employee-litigants were deemed
disabled under the law. These fluctuations over time may reflect
Supreme Court decisions and the 2008 passage of the ADAAA by
Congress (the potential effects of these events are discussed in more
detail below). Among cases decided after the amendments act went
into effect on January 1, 2009, the rate of employees deemed
disabled rose to 64 percent (nine out of fourteen cases).

139. See Francis v. City of Meridan, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Spiegel v.
Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010); Lescoe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.-SCI Frackville,
464 F. App’x 50 (3d Cir. 2012); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir.
2016).
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Results for Disability
Determinations

Only Actual Claim
Only Perceived Claim
Positive Appellate Decision
Period 1993–2000
Period 2001–2008
Period 2009–2018 (reference)
Any Appellate Decision
Physiological Cause
Substantial Limitation
Constant
N
Pseudo R2
*p < .05

Model 1
Log-odds coefficient
(Standard error)

Model 2
Log-odds coefficient
(Standard error)

1.164 (0.571)*
-0.127 (0.613)
0.437 (0.558)
-0.573 (0.591)
-0.278 (0.597)

-0.790 (0.659)
-0.196 (0.711)

-0.217 (0.499)
84
0.08

0.408 (0.596)
-3.013 (0.726)*
-2.284 (0.603)*
1.517 (0.585)
87
0.263

The regression models revealed three statistically significant
variables: bringing only an actual (as opposed to a perceived)
disability claim, a court focus on physiological condition, and a court
focus on substantial limitation. Some seemingly important
variables, including gender, occupation, bringing intersectional
claims, and providing expert witness testimony, were not
statistically significant in the models. However, given the small
sample size, these results do not necessarily indicate that these
factors are not relevant.
In Model 1, bringing only a claim of actual disability increased
the likelihood that a plaintiff would be considered disabled by the
courts. Negative appellate decisions did not have a statistically
significant effect. Claim type (perceived disability, actual disability,
or both) was statistically significant in many iterations of Model 1,
suggesting that courts have struggled to understand the social
model of disability, in which disability can and does arise when
individuals act on stereotypical beliefs.
Model 2 confirmed that both aspects of the ADA’s disability
definition (1—possession of physical or mental impairment; 2—
substantial limitation of major life activities) pose significant
hurdles for fat plaintiffs. The requirement in certain districts that
plaintiffs present expert testimony that their weight either (1) is a
physiological condition or disorder or (2) is caused by such a
condition or disorder hindered plaintiffs’ claims that their weight is
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a physical impairment. When this type of medicalization was the
primary legal issue, as it was in twenty cases, plaintiffs were
significantly less likely to be deemed disabled by a court. To my
knowledge, this requirement is unique to fat plaintiffs (although
there are no parallel studies in which researchers analyzed all or
most cases for other specific categories of disability) and likely
reflects the pervasive influence of negative stereotypes that portray
fat as a character flaw rather than a medically neutral impairment.
A comparison to prior research140 and legal scholarship 141
shows that with respect to the second aspect of the ADA’s definition
of disability (substantial limitation of major life activities), fat
plaintiffs fared similarly to other potentially disabled people. When
courts focused on this aspect of the disability definition (relative to
the impairment aspect), fat litigants were significantly less likely to
be considered disabled under the ADA. However, this finding may
be less important in the future because the ADAAA specifically
sought to lower the bar for proving a substantial limitation. Of the
twenty-six cases in the sample that focused on substantial
limitations, only six occurred after the passage of the ADAAA.
Because the ADAAA did not, however, change the definition of
impairment, determining whether fat is a physiological condition
may remain an obstacle for fat plaintiffs.
IV. Discussion
Since the passage of the ADA in 1990, courts have struggled
to determine whether obesity is an ADA-protected disability. The
finding that 50 percent of employee-litigants were considered
disabled and thus legally protected, while 50 percent were not,
highlights the lack of a legal consensus on this issue. This result
may also represent a failure to equitably apply the ADA to similarly
situated employees, although the pattern makes sense in the
context of the ADA’s mandate that courts individually assess a
plaintiff’s condition. Further, the results align with prior empirical
studies of the ADA, which have found that prior to the ADAAA,
most people bringing a claim of disability employment
discrimination lost because courts did not consider them

140. See Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
supra note 75; Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, supra note 75; Befort, supra note 14.
141. See BACKLASH, supra note 4; O’BRIEN, supra note 18. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS,
supra note 9 (examining the definition of “disabled” through the creation of disability
law).
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disabled.142 While the experiences of fat employees who bring ADA
claims is typical of ADA employee claimants overall—courts have
struggled to determine the disability status of employees with a
variety of impairments—the requirement that an individual prove
an underlying cause for their impairment appears to be unique to
fat plaintiffs. This requirement, along with judicial reluctance to
accept fat people’s claims of perceived disability, suggests that
traditional, individualized, and medicalized understandings of
disability continue to hold sway in the courts. Within these
traditional perspectives, disability is understood as arising from an
individual’s body rather than social structures; this understanding
allows space for anti-fat stereotypes to influence legal judgments.
Employee-litigants who argued that they were actually
disabled by their fat, and not just stereotyped as disabled, were
more likely to be considered disabled by the courts and thus covered
by the ADA. Their weight may have substantially limited their
abilities more than the weights of employees bringing only
perceived disability claims. However, weight was not a statistically
significant predictor of disability outcomes, and the content
analysis revealed no relationship between weight and the likelihood
of being considered disabled. Alternatively, courts may have been
more comfortable with actual disability claims because these claims
reflect common-sense ideas of disability (i.e., that a disability is
primarily the result of an individual’s physical deficit). Claims of
perceived disability, in contrast, reflect the social model of disability
(espoused by disability rights activists, scholars, and parts of the
ADA itself) in which the major limitations of disability arise because
of societal discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping. The
limitations resulting from the physical impairment itself are less
important in the social model. This understanding of disability has
not yet overtaken more traditional perspectives in mainstream
society. Fat studies argues for a strong version of the social model,
asserting that nothing is inherently wrong with fat. Instead, fat
becomes a limitation when others perceive it to be a character flaw,
a moral failing, or a sign of an individual’s weakness.
These perceptions of fatness likely underlie some of the courts’
requirements to prove that a person’s weight is a physiological
condition or is caused by a physiological condition. The ADA and
Rehabilitation Act have no requirement that employees must prove

142. See Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
supra note 75; Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, supra note 75; Befort, supra note 14.
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the cause of their impairment.143 The EEOC regulations defining
impairment state that a physical impairment is any physiological
disorder (not something caused by a physiological disorder) that
affects a major bodily function.144 Thus, this requirement seems to
reflect judicial discomfort with the notion that fat individuals are
disabled. Further, the notion that fat individuals contributed to
their weight is not the only belief underlying this discomfort, as
shown by the treatment of other conditions that can be caused by
an individual’s conduct. Recent EEOC regulations include lists of
expected ADA-protected disabilities (conditions that are usually,
but not always, disabilities under the ADA) that are not
traditionally thought of as disabilities and that may be caused by
an individual’s conduct, such as diabetes, cancer, skin burns, and
HIV.145 Indeed, many recognized disabilities may be caused in some
part by an individual’s conduct. Sky-diving accidents can lead to
mobility impairments, poor judgment can lead to amputations, Deaf
people sometimes choose not to have curative surgery. Therefore,
the requirement that an individual must prove the cause of their
fatness may have less to do with actual causation and more to do
with proving their deservingness.
As Anna Kirkland argued in her analysis of logics of
personhood, courts rely on different rationales to determine who is
worthy and deserving of anti-discrimination protection. 146
Historically, disability has been used as a medicalized rationale to
differentiate the undeserving and deserving poor. In the focal cases,
courts turned to this medicalized tradition to determine whether fat
employees are worthy of anti-discrimination protection.
Specifically, some courts attempted to make this determination via
the requirement of cause. Is fatness a trait that deserves protection?
Or is it a trait that society should discourage by not providing legal
protection? This shift toward the use of disability as a medicalized
rationale is ironic, given the disability rights movement’s calls to
143. As the First Circuit has explained:
The Rehabilitation Act contains no language suggesting that its protection
is linked to how an individual became impaired, or whether an individual
contributed to his or her impairment. On the contrary, the Act indisputably
applies to numerous conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by
voluntary conduct, such as alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, cancer resulting
from cigarette smoking, heart disease resulting from excesses of various
types, and the like.
Cook v. R.I., Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st
Cir. 1993).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2012).
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2012).
146. See FAT RIGHTS, supra note 56.
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move away from medicalized understandings of disability. More
importantly, the view that fat people are not disabled hurts claims
for social inclusion of traditionally disabled people by solidifying
negative stereotypes about the “truly disabled.”
Many of the courts that focused on identifying physiological
causes stated in their decisions that it was the court’s role to
distinguish the “truly disabled” from fat people, whose limitations
were characterized as relatively minor.147 This understanding of
disability contradicts the work of disability rights activists and
scholars, as well as those involved in fat studies, in two ways. First,
this perspective emphasizes a view of disabled people as radically
different from non-disabled people because of the severity of their
impairments, and it attempts to locate disability in the body,
instead of in society. However, survey and interview data suggest
that most people with disabilities identify stereotypes as the
primary barrier they encounter, not limitations resulting from their
impairment.148 Many disability studies scholars argue that disabled
people do not want a cure for their impairments, they want access
and equal treatment,149 which suggests that the impairments of
people considered traditionally disabled are not as severe as
commonly thought. Second, this understanding of disability ignores
a key insight of the social model of disability. What counts as a
disability will necessarily change over time because disability arises
from the interaction of the social world and an impairment. 150
Therefore, definitions of disability must consider the way cultural
values give rise to disability. At one moment in history, a society
may view an impairment as a valuable difference while at another,
it may view the same impairment as a tragedy or a defect. Under
the social model of disability, an impairment becomes a disability
147. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ga. Power Co., 81 F.Supp.2d 1365, 1370 (N.D. Ga., 2000)
(observing the court’s conclusion that Coleman’s obesity was not a disability was
“necessary in order to avoid a dilution of the ADA” which “was meant to protect
people who are truly disabled”).
148. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Paternalism and Public Policy, 20 SOC’Y 36 (1983);
Micheal L. Shier, John R. Graham & Marion E. Jones, Barriers to Employment as
Experienced by Disabled People: A Qualitative Analysis in Calgary and Regina,
Canada, 24 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 63 (2009); Dana Wilson‐Kovacs, Michelle K. Ryan,
S. Alexander Haslam & Anna Rabinovich, ‘Just Because You Can Get a Wheelchair
in the Building Doesn’t Necessarily Mean that You Can Still Participate’: Barriers to
the Career Advancement of Disabled Professionals, 23 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 705 (2008).
149. See ELI CLARE, BRILLIANT IMPERFECTION: GRAPPLING WITH CURE 184 (2017)
(“Cure promises us so much, but it will never give us justice.”); Garland-Thomson,
supra note 16.
150. Garland-Thomson, supra note 16 at 591 (arguing that disability is derived
from social incompatibility rather than an individual’s shortcoming). See generally
Shakespeare, supra note 26.
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when society creates policies and structures that isolate,
discriminate against, and culturally devalue the people who possess
that physical characteristic.
Conclusion
In conclusion, fat fits within a strong social model of disability,
a model that truly understands that disability arises from cultural
reactions to a devalued body, not the body itself. The ADA reflects
a strong social model through the claim of perceived disability. As
disability and fat rights advocates bring claims under the ADA, they
should carefully consider whether to emphasize the physical
limitations of their clients or the stereotypical understandings that
create disabling limitations. Courts currently reward those who
conform to traditional notions of disability as arising from the
limited body, however, this representation of disability may not
benefit the disability rights movement as a whole. Instead, it may
further medicalize disability. Future research should examine fatas-a-disability determinations at the state level, within other
federal statutes, and internationally. Although many states follow
the ADA interpretations in analyzing state law claims, New York,
which has found fat to be a covered disability in the past, is a
notable exception.151 Further, the Canadian Transport Agency
recently affirmed in an adjudication that fat could give rise to
disability based on particular social structures and contexts. 152
Future research could identify more jurisdictions in which fat has
been treated as a disability. Policy makers and disability rights
activists should consider fat studies scholars’ assertions that there
is nothing wrong with the fat body. This perspective aligns with
research on disabled people’s lived experiences, which has shown
that stereotypes are the primary barrier people report. Courts must
move away from the current medicalized understanding of
disability and recognize that, for both fat and disabled people,
stereotypes give rise to disablement.

151. See Frank v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 2d 160, 169
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (comparing State Div. of Human Rights on Complaint of McDermott
v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 219 (N.Y. 1985), in which “clinically diagnosed” obesity
was found to constitute a disability under the New York State Human Rights Law,
with Delta Air Lines v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 91 N.Y.2d 5, 72–73
(N.Y. 1997), in which plaintiffs had to establish they were “medically incapable of
meeting Delta’s weight requirements”).
152. Estate of Eric Norman v. Air Canada, Decision No. 6-AT-A-2008, CAN.
TRANSP. AGENCY (Jan. 10, 2008), https://www.otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/ruling/6-at-a-2008
[https://perma.cc/8V7R-CNDT].

